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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge 
 Henry Freeman and Gelean Mark appeal from their 
individual judgments of conviction and sentence entered by 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands for conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance.  We 
will resolve these unconsolidated appeals together because 
they arise from a common factual background and were tried 
together before the same District Court.  Each defendant 
alleges a series of legal and procedural errors on the part of 
the District Court during trial and at sentencing.  We will 
affirm as to Freeman, but we will vacate and remand for 
resentencing as to Mark.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual History 
 On December 19, 2006, Freeman and Mark were 
charged by a federal grand jury in a fourteen-count 
indictment
1
 for their part in a conspiracy to import substantial 
quantities of cocaine throughout the United States via 
commercial aircraft at the Cyril E. King Airport located in St. 
Thomas, United States Virgin Islands.  Count I of the 
                                              
1
 The indictment also charged Vernon Fagan, Walter 
Ells, Kelvin Moses, Craig Claxton, Kerry Woods, Glenson 
Isaac, Everette Mills and Dorian Swann.  Claxton and Woods 
have separately appealed, and those appeals will be separately 
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indictment charged both Freeman and Mark with conspiracy 
to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  The government alleged that 
both Freeman and Mark, along with four other defendants:   
[D]id knowingly and 
intentionally, combine, conspire . 
. . and agree together . . . to 
knowingly and intentionally 
possess with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance, namely five 
(5) kilograms or more of a 
mixture and substance containing 
a detectable amount of cocaine, . . 
. in violation of Title 21, United 
States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) 
and 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II).          
 
Freeman App. at 24.  Count II charged Mark, along with two 
others, with conspiracy to import cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 963.  Counts III-XIII charged both Freeman and 
Mark, along with two others, with possession of cocaine on 
board an aircraft, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 955.  Mark was 
charged in Count XIV with possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.      
B.  Procedural History 
(1)  The Trial 
 Freeman's and Mark's trial commenced on September 
5, 2007.  The government presented its evidence against the 
defendants through the testimony of several cooperating 
witnesses.  James Springette and Elton Turnbull, established 
leaders in the drug conspiracy, set forth an overview of the 
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conspiracy.  Turnbull testified that he recruited Mark into the 
drug trafficking organization in late 1999 because of his 
connections with employees at the Cyril E. King Airport.  
Turnbull testified that Mark's role in the conspiracy primarily 
consisted of the movement of narcotics through the airports to 
North Carolina and that he and Mark shared the responsibility 
of finding the drug couriers.  Turnbull testified that once the 
drugs arrived in St. Thomas, Mark stored the drugs until it 
was time to transport them to North Carolina.   
 Glenson Isaac, a fellow co-conspirator and a 
cooperating witness for the government, testified against both 
Mark and Freeman.  He testified that after Turnbull's arrest, 
he sold drugs under Mark, with Freeman acting as the middle 
person, and that he used Mark's route going through 
Charlotte, North Carolina, to transport the drugs from St. 
Thomas.  Isaac testified that Mark arranged for the trafficking 
of multi-kilogram loads of cocaine from St. Thomas to North 
Carolina with him on numerous occasions and that Freeman 
advised him as to whom the courier would be in a number of 
those deliveries.  He also testified that he met with both Mark 
and Freeman in St. Thomas to discuss and plan ways to 
transport cocaine from the Virgin Islands to North Carolina 
and, finally, presented an organizational chart of the drug 
organization, identifying Mark as a key supplier of cocaine.   
 Following the testimony of the government's 
witnesses, defense counsel was afforded an opportunity to 
cross-examine each of the government's witnesses.  At the 
close of the government's case, the District Court dismissed 
Counts III through XIII against both Freeman and Mark, 
pursuant to Rule 29 motions for judgments of acquittal.  The 
District Court denied the motions as to the remaining counts.   
(2)  The Jury Instructions 
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 Both Freeman and Mark presented their proposed jury 
instructions to the District Court, which included an 
instruction that the government must prove the existence of 
"five or more kilograms of cocaine" as an essential element of 
Count I.  The District Court rejected this request, instead 
instructing the jury, along with all of the other elements of 
conspiracy, that they need only find that the conspiracy 
involved a "measurable amount of the controlled substance 
alleged in the indictment."  Freeman and Mark also objected 
to the court's "measurable amount of cocaine" instruction, but 
their objection was overruled.   
 After five days of deliberation, the jury returned guilty 
verdicts for both Mark and Freeman as to Count I, but failed 
to reach a decision as to Mark's charges in Counts II and XIV.  
Following the guilty verdict on Count I, the District Court 
submitted to the jury the following in the form of a post-
verdict question: "[a]s to Count 1, conspiracy with intent to 
distribute a controlled substance, do you find that five 
kilograms or more was involved[?]"  After a period of 
deliberation, the jury failed to arrive at a unanimous decision.  
Mark's retrial on Counts II and XIV was scheduled for a later 
date.
2
          
(3)  Freeman's Sentencing 
                                              
2
 Mark's retrial on Counts II and XIV was scheduled to 
commence on May 24, 2010.  Mark was to be on trial along 
with several of his co-defendants, who were arrested after the 
first trial and were to be tried on different counts of the 
indictment.  Just before that trial, however, the government 
moved to dismiss Counts II and XIV against Mark.  As a 
result, Mark was never retried.   
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 Freeman's sentencing hearing was held on April 15, 
2009.  Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office 
prepared a presentence investigation report ("PSR"), which 
categorized Freeman's base offense level at 12 because "the 
jury did not find an amount of controlled substances 
attributable to [him]."  The PSR then increased his base 
offense level by four levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), 
due to his role in the conspiracy as "an organizer and leader 
of criminal activity that involved five or more participants."  
It also assigned Freeman a criminal history score of I.  Based 
upon these calculations, the PSR's final recommendation for 
Freeman was a base offense level of 16 and a criminal history 
category of I, resulting in a guidelines range of 21 to 27 
months in prison.   
 Freeman's PSR was amended twice by the Probation 
Office between the date of the initial PSR and the sentencing 
hearing.  During that interim period, Freeman raised a number 
of objections to his base offense level and his role in the 
offense.  The District Court held a hearing on October 2, 2008 
to allow the parties to set forth their arguments regarding 
those objections.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
District Court found that there was sufficient evidence 
presented at trial to support a finding that Freeman was "a 
manager and a supervisor" in the conspiracy.  See Transcript 
of Proceedings at 26-28, United States v. Freeman, No. 3:06-
cr-00080-CVG-RM (D.V.I. Jan, 29, 2009), ECF No. 724.  
The Court then found, based upon a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Freeman "conspire[d] with intent to distribute . 
. . at least 50 kilograms of cocaine."  Id. at 28-30.   
 The PSR was thereafter amended to reflect the District 
Court's finding that Freeman had conspired to distribute a 
minimum of fifty kilograms of cocaine.  His base offense 
level was set to 36, and then increased by three levels for his 
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role as an organizer of criminal activity involving five or 
more participants.  Following these adjustments, the PSR 
recommended a base offense level of 39 and a criminal 
history category of I, resulting in a guidelines range of 262 to 
327 months of imprisonment.         
 At the sentencing hearing, Freeman again raised 
several objections to the final PSR.  Specifically, he objected 
to the District Court's findings of fact regarding the quantity 
of cocaine attributable to him and the resulting sentencing 
guideline range given the jury's failure to make any actual 
findings as to the quantity of cocaine involved in the 
conspiracy.  The government argued that the Court should 
find that 89.5 kilograms of cocaine were attributable to 
Freeman and that, instead of a three-level increase for his role 
as an organizer in the conspiracy, a two-level increase (to 38) 
should be imposed, providing for a sentence range of 235 to 
293 months' imprisonment.  Given the statutory maximum 
sentence of 20 years applicable to the offense, however, the 
government asked the Court to impose a sentence between 
188 and 240 months' imprisonment.  After hearing argument 
from both parties, the Court sentenced Freeman to 188 
months' imprisonment.   
(4)  Mark's Sentencing Hearing 
 Mark's sentencing hearing was held on October 19, 
2010.  His initial PSR, like Freeman's, categorized his base 
offense level at 12 because the jury did not find an amount of 
controlled substances attributable to him.  His base offense 
level was then increased by four levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.1(a), due to his role in the offense as "an organizer and 
leader of criminal activity that involved five or more 
participants."  He had a criminal history score of I.  Mark's 
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base offense level of 16 and criminal history category of I 
resulted in a guidelines range of 21 to 27 months in prison.   
 The Probation Office amended Mark's PSR following 
its receipt of reports from an investigation conducted by the 
Drug Enforcement Administration.  Those reports detailed 
Mark's involvement with various amounts of cocaine during 
the conspiracy and attributed to him a total of 96.5 kilograms 
of cocaine.  Following the inclusion of that information into 
the PSR, Mark was assigned a new base offense level of 36.  
The PSR then increased his base offense level by four levels, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), and arrived at an adjusted 
offense level of 40.  Based upon those new calculations, 
Mark's guidelines range increased to 292 to 365 months in 
prison.   
 Mark raised his objections to the amended PSR at his 
sentencing hearing.  He specifically objected to the quantity 
of cocaine attributed to him in the PSR, given the jury's 
inability to reach a conclusion regarding a specific quantity of 
cocaine, and the increase in his base offense level for his role 
in the conspiracy.  After the Court heard argument from both 
parties, the Court found that Mark was responsible for 15 to 
50 kilograms of cocaine, which lowered his base offense level 
to 34 instead of 36, and that there was sufficient evidence in 
the record to warrant a three-level adjustment for his role in 
the conspiracy.  The District Court then added three levels to 
his adjusted base offense level of 34, arriving at an adjusted 
offense level of 37, and concluded that Mark's new guidelines 
range was 210 to 262 months in prison.  The Court then 
sentenced Mark to a term of 210 months' imprisonment. 
 11 
 This appeal followed.
3
 
III.  DISCUSSION 
 Because Mark and Freeman both challenge the District 
Court's jury instructions regarding Count I of the indictment, 
we will address that aspect of the two appeals together in Part 
III.A.  We will address Mark's and Freeman's challenges to 
their sentencing decisions in Part III.B.  The remainder of the 
issues raised in Freeman's appeal will then be addressed in 
Part III.C and the remainder of the issues raised in Mark's 
appeal will be addressed in Part III.D.   
A.  Jury Instructions 
 Freeman and Mark first argue that the District Court 
erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of drug 
conspiracy.  They specifically argue that, in order for a 
conviction to be obtained against them on Count I, the 
government had to prove the existence of "5 kilograms or 
more of cocaine" as charged in the indictment.   
 Our review of a trial court's jury instructions, regarding 
both phrasing and omissions, is for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 499 (3d Cir. 2006).  "In 
reviewing a refusal to give a requested jury instruction," see 
id., we evaluate "whether the proffered instruction was legally 
correct, whether or not it was substantially covered by other 
instructions, and whether its omission prejudiced the 
defendant," United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 755-56 (3d 
Cir. 1999)).     
                                              
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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 The statutory provision under which Freeman and 
Mark were charged in the indictment, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 
provides: "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally – to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or 
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a 
controlled substance."  We have previously stated that the 
elements of the base offense therefore include: "(1) knowing 
or intentional (2) possession (3) with intent to distribute (4) a 
controlled substance."  United States v. Lacy, 446 F.3d 448, 
454 (3d Cir. 2006).  The District Court's instruction to the 
jury mirrored our interpretation of the elements of the base 
offense.  The instruction specified that: 
 In order to sustain its 
burden of proof for the crime of 
conspiracy to possess with intent 
to distribute a controlled 
substance . . . , the government 
must prove the following essential 
elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt:  
 
 First, that no later than 
1999, and continuing until 
October 2005, a conspiracy, 
agreement or understanding to 
possess with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance, as described 
in the indictment, was formed, 
reached, or entered into by two or 
more persons;  
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 And second, that at some 
time during the existence or life of 
the conspiracy, agreement, or 
understanding, the defendant 
knew the purpose of the 
agreement, and with that 
knowledge then deliberately 
joined the conspiracy, agreement, 
or understanding.   
. . .  
 The evidence received in 
this case need not prove the actual 
amount of the controlled 
substance alleged in the 
indictment.   
 
 The government must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, 
however, that a measurable 
amount of the controlled 
substance alleged in the relevant 
count of the indictment that you 
are considering was, in fact, 
involved. 
 
Transcript of Proceedings at 24, 34 United States v. Mark, 
No. 3:06-cr-00080-CVG-RM (D.V.I. Mar. 18, 2008), ECF 
No. 641. 
 Freeman's and Mark's indictment did not just charge 
the base offense, however, it specified a particular drug type 
and amount, namely, "five (5) kilograms or more of cocaine," 
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in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II).  The drug 
type and amount, for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841, serve to 
increase the statutory maximum penalty allowed once a 
conviction is obtained.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).  Following 
the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000), those types of facts must be submitted to a 
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 490 
("[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").  This is so because 
such facts are treated as the "functional equivalent[]" of an 
element of a greater offense.  Lacy, 446 F.3d at 454 (quoting 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).  The essential elements of 
Freeman's and Mark's charged offense are, therefore,: (1) 
knowing or intentional (2) possession (3) with intent to 
distribute (4) five kilograms or more (5) of cocaine.   
 It is clear, here, that the District Court did not instruct 
the jury as to the fourth element – the existence of "five 
kilograms or more."  However, this point does not prove fatal 
to the jury charge.  Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure informs our analysis.  See, e.g., 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 826 
(3d Cir. 1987) (noting that Rule 31(c) allowed the judge to 
substitute a charge on the lesser included offense of attempted 
aggravated rape for the original charge of aggravated rape); 
United States v. Lucien, 61 F.3d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that Rule 31(c) allows a district court to give a lesser-
included offense instruction where certain requirements are 
met).     
 Rule 31(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] 
defendant may be found guilty of . . . an offense necessarily 
included in the offense charged."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c).  An 
"offense is not 'necessarily included' in another unless the 
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elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of 
the charged offense."  Lacy, 446 F.3d at 452 (quoting 
Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989)).  A 
lesser included offense instruction would be improper, 
therefore, "where the [potential lesser included offense] 
requires an element not required for the greater offense."  Id. 
(emphasis added) (quoting Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716).  Such 
a rule protects defendants' "rights by ensuring that they have 
'constitutionally sufficient notice' that they face conviction on 
all lesser included offenses."  Id.; see also Walker v. United 
States, 418 F.2d 1116, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (noting that the 
indictment is sufficient notice to a defendant that he may be 
called to defend a lesser included charge); accord Fransaw v. 
Lynaugh, 810 F.2d 518, 529 (5th Cir. 1987); Seymour v. 
Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 558 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
No Neck, 472 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2007).     
 In the instant case, without the essential element of 
"five kilograms or more," the District Court merely instructed 
the jury on the base offense, as described above.  It follows, 
therefore, that in order to resolve the jury instruction issue 
raised by Freeman and Mark, we must determine whether the 
base offense, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), constitutes a lesser 
included offense of the charged offense, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II).  To do so, we must compare the 
elements of the charged offense with those of the base 
offense.   
 We have addressed this exact question before.  In 
Lacy, we were tasked with determining, among other things, 
whether the district court properly charged the defendant 
with, and whether the jury properly convicted him of, two 
separate lesser included offenses.  446 F.3d at 455.  There, the 
defendant was charged with possession with intent to 
distribute five grams or more of a substance containing a 
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detectable amount of cocaine base, or crack cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b).  Id. at 450.  A jury 
acquitted Lacy of the offense charged in the indictment, but 
convicted him of two lesser included offenses – simple 
possession of more than five grams of cocaine base, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844, and possession with intent to 
distribute an unspecified amount of cocaine base, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Lacy focused his appeal on his 
simple possession conviction, arguing, among other things, 
that it was not a lesser included offense of possession with 
intent to distribute.   We disagreed with Lacy in that regard, 
but also made a point to note that his conviction for 
possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of 
cocaine was a lesser included offense of his charged offense 
as well:  
It is also clear that the second 
offense of which Lacy was 
convicted – which he does not 
challenge on appeal – is a lesser 
included offense of the charged 
offense.  Possession with intent to 
distribute an unspecified quantity 
of cocaine base requires proof of 
a 'subset' of the facts that must be 
proved to sustain a conviction for 
possession with intent to 
distribute five grams or more of 
cocaine base – everything except 
for the drug amount. 
 
Id. at 455 (emphasis added).  Lacy thus makes clear that § 
841(a) – possession with intent to distribute an unspecified 
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quantity of controlled substance – constitutes a lesser 
included offense of § 841(b) – possession with intent to 
distribute a specified quantity of a controlled substance.  It 
follows, then, that a conviction may be properly obtained 
under § 841(a) where the indictment alleges a violation of § 
841(b).     
 On a final note, Freeman and Mark argue that the 
District Court's lesser included offense instruction (omitting 
the specified amount of cocaine) was improper in the instant 
case because there was no evidence to justify it.  They argue 
that all of the evidence presented at trial consisted of 
testimony that they were involved with shipments of cocaine 
in excess of five kilograms and that there was never any 
dispute that the cocaine quantities at issue involved less than 
five kilograms.  They claim that these facts demonstrate that a 
jury could not rationally find them guilty of the lesser offense 
and acquit them of the greater.  We disagree.  On the facts of 
this case, wherein multiple defendants participated at varying 
levels in a grand scheme involving the importation of 
cocaine, a jury could rationally conclude that the conspiracy 
involved the amounts of cocaine each witness testified to, but 
not attribute a specific amount (beyond a reasonable doubt) to 
a particular defendant.  Furthermore, as Freeman and Mark 
acknowledge, the government's witnesses testified to varying 
amounts of cocaine, or a "measurable amount," which 
demonstrates that the District Court's lesser included offense 
instruction was indeed supported by the evidence.  We will 
reject Freeman's and Mark's argument in this regard.
 
 
 The District Court, therefore, properly charged the jury 
on possession with intent to distribute a "measurable amount" 
of cocaine as a lesser included offense of possession with 
intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine.
 
 
Freeman's and Mark's convictions will remain undisturbed.  
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Government of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 554 
(3d Cir. 1967) ("[T]here may be a conviction of a crime 
which is necessarily included within the higher offense 
charged."). 
B.  Sentencing Errors 
 We now turn to Mark's and Freeman's allegations of 
error at their individual sentencing hearings.  Freeman and 
Mark both argue that their sentences should be reversed 
because they were imposed with judicial factfinding as to 
drug quantities, using a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, in violation of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2151 (2013).
 4
  Both also challenge the adequacy of the 
District Court's factfinding regarding their drug quantity 
determinations.  Mark also argues separately that the District 
Court erred at his sentencing hearing by: (1) failing to find a 
specific amount of cocaine attributable to him in the 
conspiracy; (2) failing to state a factual basis for imposing 
aggravating role enhancements; (3) failing to address his 
request for a downward departure based upon his allegations 
of serial prosecution; and (4) mistakenly requiring parity of 
sentence between him and his co-defendants.   
                                              
4
 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne, 
and after the parties had already submitted their original 
briefs, our Court directed the parties to submit supplemental 
letter briefs regarding the impact of Alleyne on the District 
Court's sentencing decision.  Both defendants argued that 
Alleyne counseled in favor of a remand for resentencing.  
Prior to Alleyne, Freeman's and Mark's only arguments in this 
regard challenged the adequacy of the District Court's factual 
findings.   
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 We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an 
abuse of discretion, which proceeds in two stages of analysis.  
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc).  We first review for procedural error, ensuring that the 
district court:  (1) correctly calculated the defendant’s 
advisory Guidelines range; (2) appropriately considered any 
motions for a departure under the Guidelines; and (3) gave 
meaningful consideration to the sentencing factors set forth in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 
152 (3d Cir. 2011).  If the district court has committed 
procedural error, "'we will generally remand the case for re-
sentencing, without going any further.'"  United States v. 
Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Wright, 642 
F.3d at 152).  If the sentencing decision passes the first stage 
of review, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of 
the sentence.  United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 
(3d Cir. 2008).  We will find a sentence to be unreasonable 
only where "no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided."  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 
568.       
(1)  Alleyne Error 
 Freeman and Mark both argue that the District Court 
violated their Sixth Amendment rights by finding facts that 
increased the amount of cocaine attributable to each of them 
for purposes of their Guidelines calculations.  They base their 
argument on Alleyne, where the Supreme Court held that "any 
fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an 'element' 
that must be submitted to the jury" and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  133 S. Ct. at 2155.  Freeman and Mark 
contend that, because the quantities found by the District 
Court, by only a preponderance of the evidence, "exposed" 
them to a statutory minimum sentence of ten years' 
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incarceration, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), the 
District Court's factfinding violated Alleyne.  We disagree.    
 While the Supreme Court made clear that any fact that 
increases a defendant's statutory minimum sentence must be 
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, this rule does not 
foreclose a district court's ability to engage in some judicial 
factfinding.  See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court made this point perfectly clear in its decision.  
See id. at 2163 ("Our ruling today does not mean that any fact 
that influences judicial discretion must be found by a jury.  
We have long recognized that broad sentencing discretion, 
informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment."); see also id. at 2170 ("'Nothing in this history 
suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise 
discretion – taking into consideration various factors relating 
both to offense and offender – in imposing a judgment within 
the range prescribed by statute.'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481)).   
 In that regard, a number of courts, including our own, 
have agreed that "factual findings made for purposes of 
applying the Guidelines, which influence the sentencing 
judge's discretion in imposing an advisory Guidelines 
sentence and do not result in imposition of a mandatory 
minimum sentence, do not violate the rule in Alleyne."  
United States v. Ramirez-Negron, 751 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 
2014) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Smith, 751 
F.3d 107, 117 (3d Cir. 2014) ("Alleyne did not curtail a 
sentencing court's ability to find facts relevant in selecting a 
sentence within the prescribed statutory range." (emphasis in 
original)); United States v. Valdez, 739 F.3d 1052, 1054 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (finding no error in a district court's factual 
findings regarding drug quantity, which were used solely for 
purposes of determining the defendant's Guidelines range, 
 21 
where there was "no indication . . . that the district judge 
thought her sentencing discretion was cabined by a higher 
statutory minimum"); United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d 577, 
584 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding no Alleyne error where district 
court's factual findings did not alter the prescribed statutory 
penalties).  We apply the same here.    
 The statutory sentencing range supported by the jury's 
verdict as to both Freeman and Mark ranged from a period of 
no incarceration to a maximum of 20 years' incarceration.  
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (no drug quantity finding).  
Following that verdict, the District Court found that Freeman 
was responsible for at least 50 kilograms of cocaine and that 
Mark was responsible for 15 to 50 kilograms.  These findings, 
made for purposes of determining their applicable Guidelines 
ranges, were permissible under Alleyne, so long as the 
ultimate sentence imposed was within the statutorily 
prescribed range.  Mark was ultimately sentenced to a term of 
210 months of imprisonment and Freeman was sentenced to 
188 months.  Both sentences are well within the twenty-year 
statutory maximum term allowed under 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)(C).   
 We note further that there is no indication in the record 
that the District Court believed that its sentencing discretion 
was confined to a higher statutory minimum given its drug 
quantity findings.  Freeman and Mark's alleged "exposure" to 
a sentencing range with a low end of ten years of 
incarceration bears little on our inquiry into what the District 
Court actually relied upon in imposing their respective 
sentences.  See Ramirez-Negron, 751 F.3d at 51 ("The fact 
that [a defendant's] sentence falls above [a mandatory 
minimum] is insufficient to establish that the mandatory 
minimum governed or that an Alleyne error occurred.").  With 
that said, our review of both sentencing transcripts reveals no 
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reliance by the District Court on any sentencing minimum 
other than that prescribed by § 841(b)(1)(C), which is fully 
supported by the jury's verdict.  See, e.g., Transcript of 
Proceedings at 19, United States v. Mark, No. 3:06-cr-00080-
CVG-RM (D.V.I. Mar. 25, 2011), ECF No. 1308 ("I think 
with respect to Mr. Mark, it's clear, there's no finding beyond 
a reasonable doubt that would require a minimum mandatory 
. . . So I don't think that's even an issue."); see also Transcript 
of Proceedings at 31, United States v. Mark, No. 3:06-cr-
00080-CVG-RM (D.V.I. Feb. 18, 2010), ECF No. 903 
(Government stating to the District Court: "Given, however, 
that [Freeman] has a statutory limitation of 0 to 20 years, we 
would ask the Court to fashion a sentence between 188 and 
240 months, as provided by law.").  There is no Alleyne error 
in Freeman's and Mark's cases.
5
    
(2)  The District Court's Findings of Fact 
 Along with their claims of error under Alleyne, 
Freeman and Mark also challenge the adequacy of the District 
Court's factual findings regarding the quantity of drugs 
attributable to each of them.  We review a district court's 
findings of fact regarding quantity of drugs for clear error.  
United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 204 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in 
                                              
5
 At oral argument, the government conceded error on 
the part of the District Court and agreed that both Freeman's 
and Mark's cases should be remanded for resentencing.  We 
decline the government's invitation as to Freeman, as the 
record sufficiently demonstrates that the District Court's 
factual findings were made solely for the purpose of imposing 
an advisory Guidelines sentence and not for the imposition of 
any mandatory minimum. 
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sentencing proceedings.  Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3).  "This 
does not mean, however, that there is no threshold 
requirement for admissibility."  United States v. Miele, 989 
F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993).  "[I]n order to avoid 
'misinformation of constitutional magnitude,'" United States 
v. Brothers, 75 F.3d 845, 848 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting United 
States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 98 (3d Cir. 1996)), "we 
require that 'information used as a basis for sentencing under 
the Guidelines . . . have sufficient indicia of reliability to 
support its probable accuracy.'"  Id. (quoting Miele, 989 F.2d 
at 663); see also U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a); United States v. 
Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 463 (3d Cir. 1993).  "Indicia of 
reliability may come from, inter alia, the provision of facts 
and details, corroboration by or consistency with other 
evidence, or the opportunity for cross-examination."  See 
United States v. Smith, 674 F.3d 722, 732 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
 We follow a number of other circuits in applying this 
standard.  See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763 
(8th Cir. 1992) (vacating defendant's sentence because the 
drug quantity finding was based on testimony of a drug addict 
with impaired memory); United States v. Shacklette, 921 F.2d 
580 (5th Cir. 1991) (vacating sentence because district court 
relied solely on probation's officer's conclusory statement as 
to drug quantity involved); United States v. Cammisano, 917 
F.2d 1057 (8th Cir. 1990) (vacating sentence because 
uncorroborated testimony of FBI agents that defendant was 
member of organized crime was not sufficiently reliable); 
United States v. Robison, 904 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(vacating sentence because drug quantity estimates provided 
by witness who was heavy drug user lacked sufficient indicia 
of reliability)).  In doing so, we apply this standard 
rigorously.  Miele, 989 F.2d at 664.   
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 We address Freeman's and Mark's arguments of error 
with respect to the District Court's factual findings separately.     
a.  Freeman 
 In support of his argument for resentencing, Freeman 
analogizes his case to Miele, a case in which a defendant's 
sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing 
based upon the district court's failure to meet the Guidelines' 
sufficient indicia of reliability standard.  989 F.2d at 660.  
There, the defendant was indicted for conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.  Id. 
at 661.  At trial, the principal government witness was an 
addict-informant who provided inconsistent testimony.  Id. at 
662.  Without explanation, and over the defendant's 
objections to the court's reliance on the addict-informant's 
testimony in fashioning his sentence, the court concluded that 
the defendant was responsible for "in excess of five kilos," 
and sentenced him accordingly.  Id.   
 On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court's 
drug quantity finding was not supported by a preponderance 
of the evidence and, thus, his base offense level was 
calculated incorrectly.  Id.  We agreed, noting "the numerous 
inconsistencies in the record, the fact that the source of most 
of the critical evidence was an addict-informant with an 
impaired memory, and the lack of any findings by the district 
court other than a single conclusory finding as to drug 
quantity."  Id. at 660.  We also noted that there was no 
indication in the record that the district court made any 
findings to resolve the defendant's challenge to the drug 
quantity estimate in his PSR.  Id. at 665.  We observed that 
this failure alone was grounds for vacating the defendant's 
sentence and remanding for further proceedings.  Id. 
 Freeman argues that, similar to Miele, the District 
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Court failed to provide an explanation as to why Isaac's 
testimony was sufficient for the quantity finding.  Freeman 
points out that he made the court aware of all the evidence 
that he believed diminished Isaac as a reliable witness, 
including his contention that Isaac's testimony failed to 
establish: (1) that drug proceeds should have been forfeited; 
(2) that five kilograms or more of cocaine was involved in the 
conspiracy; and (3) the amount of cocaine attributable to 
Freeman in his individual capacity.  Freeman's arguments are 
unavailing.  Our review of the record reveals that the District 
Court provided ample explanation at Freeman's sentencing 
hearing as to the basis upon which it relied in attributing at 
least 50 kilograms of cocaine to Freeman and that it was 
justified in doing so: 
The testimony, again, of Mr. Isaac 
. . . indicates that there were a 
number of deliveries in which Mr. 
Isaac was involved in, which he 
testified that Mr. Mark and Mr. 
Freeman were involved, and those 
deliveries certainly exceeded 50 
kilograms of cocaine. . . . [T]he 
Court agrees with the defense that 
the jury could not agree on an 
amount . . . But for Guideline 
purposes, the Court has to 
determine something that the jury 
doesn't, and that is determine 
whether there is a preponderance 
of the evidence, not beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . Looking at 
all the evidence, and indeed 
looking at the evidence presented 
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by Mr. Isaac, and the 
corroboration offered by the 
couriers, who indeed corroborated 
significant portions of his 
testimony, they certainly testified 
that they did many of the things 
that he testified about.  So the 
Court finds that there is a 
preponderance of the evidence to 
make the finding that [Freeman] . 
. . did, in fact, possess with intent 
to – or conspire with intent to 
distribute between – at least 50 
kilograms of cocaine.     
 
Transcript of Proceedings at 28-30, United States v. Mark, 
No. 3:06-cr-00080-CVG-RM (D.V.I. Feb. 18, 2010), ECF 
No. 724.   
 The District Court correctly observed that it was 
required to adhere to a preponderance of the evidence 
standard in making its determination, and then assessed all of 
the evidence presented while applying that standard.  In doing 
so, it addressed the testimony of both Isaac and other drug 
couriers.  While the District Court does appear to rely heavily 
on Isaac's testimony, it supports this reliance by noting that 
his testimony was corroborated significantly by other drug 
couriers.  See Smith, 674 F.3d at 732 (noting that indicia of 
reliability may come from both corroboration and consistency 
with other evidence).  Even without corroboration, we find no 
error in the District Court's reliance on Isaac's testimony.  See 
Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 204 (recognizing that courts have 
estimated drug quantities based on testimony by a co-
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defendant (citing United States v. Maggard, 146 F.3d 843, 
848 (8th Cir. 1998))).  Unlike the witness in Miele, Isaac was 
not an addict-informant, nor did he present himself in any 
other way that would require additional caution in relying on 
his testimony.  In light of the record before us, we cannot say 
that the District Court committed clear error in relying on 
Isaac's testimony to determine a specific quantity of cocaine 
for purposes of imposing sentence.  We will, therefore, affirm 
the District Court's determination of the quantity of drugs in 
Freeman's case.
6
   
b.  Mark 
 The record is not as clear in Mark's case.  At his 
                                              
6
 Freeman also argues that he has maintained an "as 
applied" Sixth Amendment challenge, basing this challenge 
upon the argument that his within-Guidelines sentence of 188 
months would be substantively unreasonable in the absence 
of the District Court's factual findings.  We are unpersuaded 
by this argument, as every court to consider the issue, 
including our own, has rejected it.  See Grier, 475 F.3d at 
564-65 (observing that the only facts a jury must determine 
are those "that increase the statutory maximum punishment"); 
accord United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370, 373-74 
(5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 
1017 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 
824-25 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 
386 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 
312 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 
745-46 (10th Cir. 2008).  Because the District Court imposed 
its sentence within the statutory maximum, and that statutory 
maximum was fully supported by the jury's verdict, the 
District Court's factual findings were proper.  Freeman's Sixth 
Amendment as-applied challenge fails.     
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October 2010 sentencing hearing, Mark raised several 
objections to his amended PSR.  As relevant to the instant 
appeal, Mark objected to the quantity of cocaine attributed to 
him and the resulting sentencing Guidelines range, given the 
jury's inability to make a specific determination as to the 
amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy.  After the 
District Court heard argument from both parties regarding 
Mark's role in the conspiracy and specific instances of trial 
testimony related to drug quantity, it stated: 
 
[T]he Court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence 
that the appropriate level should 
be 15 to 50 kilograms.  That's 
based on the information adduced 
at trial, which would put it at a 
base offense level of 34, instead 
of 36. . . .[T]he Court is mindful 
of relevant conduct and what it 
can consider, and there is an 
abundance of evidence that the 
Court cannot ignore.     
 
Transcript of Proceedings at 48, United States v. Mark, No. 
3:06-cr-00080-CVG-RM (D.V.I. Mar. 25, 2011), ECF No. 
1308.  Aside from these conclusory statements, the District 
Court offered no other explanation as to the basis for its 
findings.   
 We have previously noted that "if a defendant disputes 
a fact included in the presentence investigation report, the 
sentencing court must either resolve that dispute or state that 
it will not rely on the disputed fact."  Miele, 989 F.2d at 665; 
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see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).  As noted above, Mark's 
counsel made a number of objections to the PSR, but the 
District Court's short, conclusory response left much to be 
desired regarding what testimony and/or evidence it relied 
upon, or did not rely upon, in reaching its drug quantity 
conclusion.  This was error.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699, 707 (7th Cir. 2013) (observing that 
"a district court cannot simply select a number without at 
least some description of the reliable evidence used to support 
the findings and the method used to calculate it.").  On this 
record, we cannot conclude that the District Court's factual 
findings regarding drug quantity at Mark's sentencing hearing 
met the Guidelines' sufficient indicia of reliability standard.  
See Miele, 989 F.2d at 668 ("[W]e require that the district 
court articulate more than a conclusory finding [regarding 
drug quantity].").  We have previously emphasized the 
"particular scrutiny" that we must apply where the District 
Court fails to set forth "factual findings relating to amounts of 
drugs involved in illegal operations, [because] 'the quantity of 
drugs attributed to the defendant usually will be the single 
most important determinant of his or her sentence.'"  
Brothers, 75 F.3d at 849 (quoting United States v. Collado, 
975 F.2d 985, 995 (3d Cir. 1992)).  We must, therefore, 
vacate Mark's sentence and remand for further development 
of the record and more detailed factfinding. 
 Given our conclusion that Mark's case should be 
remanded for resentencing, we need not address his 
remaining sentencing arguments on appeal.  See United States 
v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) ("If the district 
court commits procedural error, our preferred course is to 
remand the case for re-sentencing, without going any 
further.").  Mark will have the opportunity to reassert his 
arguments before the District Court at resentencing, at which 
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time the District Court must adequately explain its decision 
accepting or rejecting his arguments in accordance with its 
duties under United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 
2006).      
(3)  Substantive Reasonableness 
 Freeman disputes only the District Court's factual 
findings at his sentencing hearing and the record is lacking in 
any other procedural errors.  We, therefore, conclude that the 
District Court's sentencing decision was procedurally 
reasonable.  Because the District Court's sentencing decision 
passes the first stage of review, we must now turn to the 
substantive reasonableness of the decision.  Levinson, 543 
F.3d at 195.   
 Here, the District Court found, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that Freeman was responsible for at least fifty 
kilograms of cocaine.  Freeman's base offense level was 
changed to 36 to reflect those findings.  Following an increase 
of two points, to 38, for his role as an organizer in the 
conspiracy, and with a criminal history category of I, 
Freeman's resulting Guidelines range was changed to 235 to 
293 months' imprisonment.  Given the statutory maximum of 
20 years for Freeman's conviction, the government requested, 
and the Court applied, a Guidelines range of only 188 to 240 
months' imprisonment.  The Court then sentenced Freeman to 
188 months' imprisonment.   
 Because there is no procedural error, and the District 
Court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence, we may 
presume the substantive reasonableness of its decision.  See 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) ("If the sentence 
is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may . .  
apply a presumption of reasonableness.").  We can ascertain 
no abuse of discretion in the Guidelines-range sentence 
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imposed here and we certainly cannot say that "no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on 
[Freeman] for the reasons the [D]istrict [C]ourt provided."  
See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  We therefore reject Freeman's 
challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. 
C.  Freeman's Remaining Arguments 
 Freeman's remaining challenges are based upon: (1) an 
alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation; and (2) an alleged violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to present a defense.  Both challenges stem 
from allegations that the District Court imposed excessive 
limitations on Freeman's cross-examination of Isaac, a 
witness Freeman describes as critical to his conviction.  
According to Freeman, had the District Court allowed him to 
pursue his chosen line of questioning, he would have 
demonstrated that Isaac was a biased, corrupt, and unreliable 
witness, and that Isaac's participation in the scheme and 
transportation of money to the Virgin Islands was unrelated to 
the charged conspiracy.  
 We review a district court's limitation on cross-
examination for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Lore, 
430 F.3d 190, 208 (3d Cir. 2005).  We will generally not 
disturb a district court's discretion in this regard "'unless no 
reasonable person would adopt [its] view.'"  United States v. 
John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 211 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d 
Cir. 2003)).  If we determine that there was an abuse of 
discretion, we then review the error to see if it was harmless.  
United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 902 (3d Cir. 1991). 
(1)  Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation 
 The Sixth Amendment "guarantees the right of an 
accused in a criminal prosecution 'to be confronted with the 
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witnesses against him.'"  Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 
(1974).  "The main and essential purpose of confrontation is 
to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
examination."  Id. at 315-16; see also Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (observing that the 
right of cross-examination is implicit in the constitutional 
right of confrontation).  This affords an opponent the 
opportunity to test the believability and truthfulness of a 
witness's testimony through the "direct and personal putting 
of questions and obtaining [of] immediate answers."  Davis, 
415 U.S. at 316.  Impeachment strategies have included the 
introduction of evidence of a prior criminal conviction of the 
witness or exposing a witness's motivation for testifying, 
"directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or 
ulterior motives . . . as they may relate directly to issues or 
personalities in the case at hand."  Id.   
 The use of such strategies is always subject "to the 
broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and 
unduly harassing interrogation."  Id.; see also Wright v. 
Vaughn, 473 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2006).  We have established 
a two-part test to determine whether a judge's limitation on 
cross-examination violates the Confrontation Clause: 
First, we must determine whether 
that ruling inhibited [a 
defendant's] effective exercise of 
her right to inquire into [the] 
witness's "motivation in 
testifying"; and second, if the 
District Court's ruling did 
significantly inhibit [the 
defendant's] exercise of that right, 
whether the constraints it imposed 
on the scope of [the] cross-
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examination fell within those 
"reasonable limits" which a trial 
court, in due exercise of its 
discretion, has authority to 
establish.     
 
United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1006 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d 
Cir. 2003)).   
 In the instant case, Freeman's counsel attempted to 
elicit the names of other individuals Isaac had previously sold 
drugs for, including individuals not involved in the instant 
conspiracy.  In doing so, Freeman's counsel asked: "Other 
than Mr. Springette, other than Elton Turnbull, other than any 
of the defendants in this courtroom, were you selling cocaine 
for anyone else in the entire universe?"  See Transcript of 
Proceedings at 310, United States v. Mark, No. 3:06-cr-
00080-CVG-RM (D.V.I. Mar. 25, 2011), ECF No. 590.  The 
government objected to that line of questioning and the 
District Court sustained that objection, ruling that such 




  The District Court rejected the same line of 
questioning the following day, noting to counsel that he had 
previously asked Isaac if he had disclosed other illegal affairs 
to law enforcement and that Isaac had already replied in the 
affirmative.  The Court informed counsel that it was not 
saying that he could not go into details of criminal conduct 
for which he had a good-faith basis that Isaac failed to 
disclose, but rather that counsel must "play by the rules." 
 Based upon our review of the record, we think it clear 
that Freeman's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was 
not violated here.  Given counsel's attempt at eliciting 
information based upon the witness's knowledge "in the 
universe," we cannot conclude that the District Court abused 
its discretion in limiting that overly broad line of questioning.  
More importantly, the District Court did not entirely foreclose 
counsel's ability to cross-examine Isaac.  It merely explained 
the basis upon which it sustained objections related to the 
specific line of questioning and warned counsel to be mindful 
of the Federal Rules.  The record demonstrates that all 
defense counsel, including Freeman's counsel both before and 
after the instant objections, had ample opportunity to cross-
                                              
 
7
 Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
provides that, "specific instances of conduct of a witness, 
other than conviction for a crime, may not be proved at trial 
through extrinsic evidence for the purpose of attacking the 
witness's character for truthfulness."  United States v. 
Williams, 464 F.3d 443, 448 (3d Cir. 2006).  A court may, "at 
its discretion[,] permit questioning about specific instances of 
conduct on cross-examination, but only if the conduct is 
probative of the witness's character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness."  Id.; see also Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).      
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examine Isaac.  We conclude that there was no abuse of 
discretion here and will, therefore, reject Freeman's argument 
that he was not afforded his Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation.
8
   
(2)  Sixth Amendment Right to Present a Defense 
 Freeman's second claim alleging violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to present a defense is based upon the same 
facts set forth in his confrontation claim.  The Supreme Court 
has observed that "[a] person's right to . . . be heard in his 
defense – a right to his day in court – are basic in our system 
of jurisprudence."  Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 
(1967) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  "The 
right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their 
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a 
defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the 
facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide 
where the truth lies."  Id. at 19.  As we concluded above, 
Freeman had ample opportunity to, and did, present his 
defense.  Freeman's claim, therefore, fails for the same 
                                              
 
8
 To support his claim that the District Court's actions 
were improper, Freeman relies on United States v. Abel, 469 
U.S. 45 (1984).  We are unpersuaded by that case.  First, Abel 
considered whether certain testimony was improperly 
admitted, whereas, here, Freeman argues that the District 
Court should have admitted certain testimony.  Second, 
Freeman ignores the overarching takeaway from Abel that 
"[a] district court is accorded a wide discretion in determining 
the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules" and 
"assessing the probative value of [evidence or testimony] . . . 
and weighing any factors counseling against admissibility is a 
matter first for the district court's sound judgment."  Id.  We 
believe that our decision is in accord with those principles. 
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reasons his confrontation claim failed.  Freeman's Sixth 
Amendment right to present a defense was properly 
preserved.  
D.  Mark's Remaining Arguments 
 Mark's remaining challenges are based upon: (1) an 
alleged variance between his indictment and the evidence 
presented at trial; and (2) alleged Brady
9
 violations.  We will 
address each of Mark's arguments in turn. 
(1)  Variance 
 Mark argues that his indictment alleged a single 
conspiracy beginning in 1999 and running through October 
2005 between himself and his co-defendants, but that the 
government's evidence at trial proved multiple separate 
conspiracies between different individuals and failed to 
establish his involvement in 1999 and 2000.  Mark claims that 
these variances prejudiced his right "not to be tried en masse 
for the conglomeration of distinct and separate offenses 
committed by others."  See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 
U.S. 750, 775 (1946).  Based upon those allegations, Mark 
argues that the District Court should have granted his Rule 29 
motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count I.   
 "A Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal obliges a 
district court to 'review the record in the light more favorable 
to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of 
fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt based on the available evidence.'"  Bobb, 471 F.3d at 
494 (quoting United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 476 (3d 
Cir. 2002)).  We review de novo an appeal of a district court's 
                                              
9
 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (Brady 
material refers to discovery that is material and favorable to 
the defense). 
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ruling on a "Rule 29 motion and independently appl[y] the 
same standard as the District Court."  Id. 
 "The issue of whether a single conspiracy or multiple 
conspiracies exist is a fact question to be decided by a jury."  
Id. (citing United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 344 (3d Cir. 
2002)).  "Where a single conspiracy is alleged in the 
indictment, there is a variance if the evidence at trial proves 
only the existence of multiple conspiracies."  Id.   
 "Although its objectives may be numerous and diverse, 
a single conspiracy exists if there is one overall agreement 
among the parties to carry out those objectives."  Id. at 494-
95 (citing Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53-54 
(1942)).  Bearing that in mind, "a single conspiracy is proved 
when there is 'evidence of a large general scheme, and of aid 
given by some conspirators to others in aid of that scheme.'"  
Id. at 494 (quoting United States v. Reyes, 930 F.2d 310, 312-
13 (3d Cir. 1991)).  "A single drug conspiracy 'may involve 
numerous suppliers and distributors operating under the aegis 
of a common core group.'"  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Quintero, 38 F.3d 1317, 1337 (3d Cir. 1994)).  Regardless of 
the circumstances, "the Government must demonstrate that 
the defendant 'knew that he was part of a larger drug 
operation.'"  Id. (quoting Quintero, 28 F.3d at 1337).   
 The aforementioned principles find their roots in the 
notion that all defendants have a substantial right "not to be 
tried en masse for the conglomeration of distinct and separate 
offenses committed by others . . . ."  Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 
775.  This notion was set forth in Kotteakos, a multi-
defendant conspiracy case, wherein the Supreme Court 
examined a discrepancy between evidence presented at trial 
and the allegations set forth in the indictment.  Id. at 752.  In 
that case, thirty-two defendants were charged with 
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participating in a single general conspiracy to obtain 
fraudulent government loans.  Id.  At trial, the government 
proved the existence of at least eight conspiracies, rather than 
the unitary scheme charged in the indictment.  Id. at 755.  The 
evidence suggested that the defendants all transacted business 
with the same key figure, but no other connection was ever 
established between the defendants.  Id. at 754.  Despite this 
inconsistency, a jury convicted the defendants, and the court 
of appeals affirmed.  Id. at 753.   
 On the defendants' appeal to the Supreme Court, the 
government conceded the existence of variance, but claimed 
that the defendants' rights were not prejudiced.  Id. at 767.  
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, noting first that 
the defendants faced a prejudicial burden in preparing for trial 
as they were forced to prepare defenses to numerous separate 
schemes to which they had no connection.  Id. at 766-67.  The 
Supreme Court then noted that the trial court also gave the 
jury misleading instructions, which confused the proof 
necessary to establish each defendant's participation in the 
single conspiracy.  Id. at 767.  This accumulation of errors, 
the Supreme Court concluded, was highly prejudicial to the 
defendants' individual cases and likely "had [a] substantial 
and injurious effect or influence on determining the jury's 
verdict."  Id. at 776.    
 We faced a similar issue in United States v. Camiel, 
689 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1982).  In that case, the defendants were 
charged with participating in a single political patronage 
scheme, designed to defraud the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania through the use of the United States mails.  Id.  
At the close of the case, the trial judge entered a judgment of 
acquittal in favor of the defendants, concluding that there was 
a variance between the offenses charged in the indictment and 
the proof offered at trial.  Id. at 33.  We affirmed the 
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judgment directing a verdict of acquittal because the 
government presented its evidence in a confusing manner that 
complicated the jury's task of determining the guilt of each 
individual defendant.  Id. at 38 (emphasis added).  We 
concluded that the variance was prejudicial because "the 
volume and manner of presentation of the evidence created 
the likelihood of spillover - i.e., that the jury might have been 
unable to separate offenders and offenses and easily could 
have transferred the guilt from one alleged co-schemer to 
another."  Id.        
 Mark argues that his case is similar to both Camiel and 
Kotteakos.  He contends that the government's evidence 
established separate and distinct conspiracies as follows: (1) 
Springette's organizational conspiracy from the 1980's until 
1999, when he was arrested; (2) Turnbull's organizational 
conspiracy while Springette was in jail; (3) Springette's 
organizational conspiracy after his escape from jail in 2001 
until his capture in 2002; (4) Isaac's organizational conspiracy 
in North Carolina until his arrest in 1999; (5) Isaac's 
organizational conspiracy after his release from prison in 
2003; (6) Swan's organizational conspiracy in Baltimore, 
Philadelphia, and New York; (7) a conspiracy involving an 
individual named Meleek Sylvester and the Sun Shine Air 
offices at the airport in St. Thomas; and (8) a conspiracy-
related contact at the airport in St. Thomas that pre-dated 
Mark's involvement with Springette and Turnbull.  He argues 
that the government deliberately exposed the jury to all of the 
other defendants' crimes in hopes that the jury would transfer 
Springette's, Turnbull's, Isaac's, and Sylvester's admissions of 
guilt to him.   
 We disagree.  The government presented evidence 
which, construed in its favor, demonstrated Mark's 
involvement and leadership role in a single, although 
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extremely complex, drug trafficking conspiracy.  The 
evidence to which Mark points, combined with the 
overwhelming testimony against him, illustrates the 
connection between the different members of the conspiracy, 
the different locations involved, the objective of the 
conspiracy, and Mark's connection to all of it.  Contrary to 
Mark's assertions, the government's evidence permitted a 
reasonable inference that each act or transaction that occurred 
during the drug trafficking scheme was in support of the 
ultimate goal of the drug trafficking organization - to import 
large quantities of drugs into the United States.  See Bobb, 
471 F.3d at 494 (noting that the government "may bear [its] 
burden entirely through circumstantial evidence." (citation 
omitted)).  
 Mark's claim regarding the discrepancy in the start 
date of his involvement with the conspiracy fails as well.  He 
alleges that Turnbull could not testify with certainty whether 
Mark's involvement with the organization began in 1999 or 
2000.  However, the record demonstrates that Turnbull 
testified to two different encounters between himself and 
Mark, at least one of which was in 1999.  The first encounter 
concerned an exchange of approximately $40,000-$50,000 
and the second related to discussions of drug-trafficking 
routes.  In that regard, Mark claims that the government failed 
to prove that the money that was exchanged between himself 
and Turnbull was related to the drug conspiracy charged or 
that he even knew what the money was for.  We reject that 
argument as well, because a jury could reasonably infer that 
the conduct at issue was both related to drugs and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy charged, especially given the 
rest of the evidence and testimony presented at trial.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Claxton, 685 F.3d 300, 311 n.17 (3d Cir. 
2012) ("Our task . . . is simply to determine whether the jury 
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could have rationally concluded that [a defendant] knowingly 
participated in the drug conspiracy . . . .").  Given Turnbull's 
testimony, there was no discrepancy between the start time of 
the conspiracy as charged and the evidence presented at trial.  
Mark's variance argument fails.     
(2)  Brady Violations 
 Mark's second argument, regarding Brady violations, 
sets forth that three years after his conviction, during the 2010 
trial of several of his co-defendants and after all of the 
remaining counts against him had been dismissed, he became 
aware of numerous letters written by key witnesses who 
testified against him at his 2007 trial.  Mark specifically 
points to: (1) letters by and between Springette and Turnbull 
to Federal Agents and Attorneys (the "Turnbull and 
Springette Letters"); and (2) letters by and between Turnbull 
and Isaac (the "Isaac Letters").  Mark alleges that the 
Turnbull and Springette Letters discuss the expectations and 
agreements between the government and the witnesses, and 
detail the consideration they would receive in exchange for 
their testimony and cooperation.  The content of those letters, 
according to Mark, contradicts the witnesses' trial testimony.  
The Isaac Letters to which Mark refers concern testimony by 
Turnbull wherein he admitted that he communicated with 
Isaac about putting a case together against someone.  Mark 
contends that those letters were never produced to any 
defense counsel.  
 42 
Alleged Brady violations often involve mixed 
questions of fact and law.  United States v. Perdomo, 929 
F.2d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 1991).  We, therefore, review a district 
court's conclusions of law de novo, and review any findings 
of fact for clear error.
 10
  Id.      
 Brady provides that "the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused, upon request 
by the defense, violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."  373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963).  A valid Brady claim, therefore, consists of three 
elements: (1) "the prosecution must suppress or withhold 
evidence, (2) which is favorable, and (3) material to the 
defense."  United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d 
                                              
 
10
 Mark filed a motion for a new trial shortly before his 
sentencing hearing, which was premised upon the 
aforementioned Brady violations.  There is no indication in 
the record that the District Court ever ruled on Mark's motion 
for a new trial.  We note, however, that "the denial of a 
pending motion may be implied by the entry of final 
judgment."  United States v. Jasso, 634 F.3d 305, 307 n.2 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (citing Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 
1021 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The denial of a motion by the district 
court, although not formally expressed, may be implied by the 
entry of a final judgment or of an order inconsistent with the 
granting of the relief sought by the motion.")); accord United 
States v. Depew, 210 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We 
treat the district court's failure to rule on Depew's motion as a 
denial of it.").  For purposes of this appeal, we deem the 
District Court's failure to rule on Mark's motion as an implicit 
denial of his motion for a new trial and will, therefore, review 
this conclusion de novo.   
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Cir. 1991) (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 
(1972)).  Once these elements have been met, a new trial is 
justified.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.   
 That same rule applies where, as in the instant case, 
witness testimony is at issue.  See id. at 154.  "[W]hen the 
'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of 
guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting 
credibility" will provide the requisite justification for a new 
trial.  Id. (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 
(1959)).  The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that 
"[w]e do not . . . automatically require a new trial whenever 'a 
combing of the prosecutors' files after the trial has disclosed 
evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have 
changed the verdict.'"  Id. at 154 (quoting United States v. 
Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968)).  A new trial is 
warranted only where "the false testimony could . . . in any 
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury . 
. . ."  Id. (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271). 
 Applying the aforementioned principles to the instant 
case, we conclude that Mark's claim regarding the Turnbull 
and Springette Letters fails at the first prong of the Brady 




 of one of his co-defendants, and it is apparent from 
those documents that the Turnbull and Springette Letters 
post-date Mark's 2007 trial.  Because there is no record 
evidence that the letters even existed at the time of Mark's 
trial, he cannot, therefore, establish prejudice as a result of the 
government's non-disclosure.  We will reject mark's Brady 
claim as to the Turnbull and Springette Letters. 
 Mark's Brady claim regarding the Isaac Letters fails on 
the first prong of the analysis as well.  The record 
demonstrates that Mark's counsel was both in possession of, 
and had knowledge of, the Isaac Letters in 2007, see 
Transcript of Proceedings at 158-68, United States v. Mark, 
No. 3:06-cr-00080-CVG-RM (D.V.I. Jan. 17, 2008), ECF No. 
                                              
 
11
 Mark's Brady claim hinges on the fact that, even to 
this day, the government has failed to produce the Turnbull 
and Springette Letters.  However, Mark makes specific 
reference to the content of the letters throughout the entirety 
of his argument without explaining how he knows the content 
of the letters or directing our attention to specific points in the 
2010 trial of his co-defendants where the issue ultimately 
arose.  One could infer here that this means that he has seen 
the documents and/or interacted with someone who had 
access to them.  Mark's failure to obtain or present those 
materials to this Court, despite the overwhelming public 
record filed in connection to this case, appears to be an 
attempt to create a Brady issue by not obtaining and 
presenting the documents for our review.  Nevertheless, we 
have reviewed the letters that are the subject of Mark's Brady 
claim, see Notice of Filing by Craig Claxton, United States v. 
Mark, No. 3:06-cr-00080-CVG-RM (D.V.I. July 26, 2010), 
ECF No. 1154, and will take judicial notice for purposes of 
our analysis.  See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).            
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593, the same letters that he claims that he never received and 
did not become aware of until after his co-defendants' trial in 
2010.
12
  In that portion of the 2007 transcript, Attorney 
Colon, Mark's counsel at trial, cross-examined Turnbull 
regarding certain communications between himself and Isaac: 
Ms. Colon: . . . Sir, isn't it also 
true that not only did Glenson 
Isaac send you letters, but that 
you sent Glenson Isaac letters, 
after your arrest? 
 
Turnbull: That is correct. 
 
Ms. Colon: And, in fact, you 
communicated with Glenson on a 
number of occasions, correct - - . . 
. by writing? 
 
Turnbull: On only two, maybe 
three occasion [sic]. 
 
* * * 
  
Ms. Colon: And, in fact, didn't 
you also advise Mr. Isaac that you 
                                              
 
12
 Mark also claims that he never had the opportunity 
to cross-examine Turnbull and Isaac about the content of the 
Isaac Letters.  As this analysis demonstrates, that contention 
is simply false.   
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needed some assistance so you 
could put together a case against 
[someone] . . . Somebody you 
called Mob? 
  
Turnbull: Okay.  That's correct.  
 
Id. at 158-161.  Those questions were clearly in reference to 
the Isaac Letters.  The government then objected to the 
defense's failure to give the letters to the government: 
Counsel for Government: I 
learned Friday, the Friday before 
trial, I talked to this witness for an 
hour.  He told me that he had 
given some letters to Mr. Isaac, 
which he knew had been given to 
the defense.  I've asked for those 
letters repeatedly.  We have never 
got them.  She has them and is 
reading from them.  . . . And I 
have a right to see the documents, 
if she's going to continue cross 
examination, at least for the 
purposes of redirect. 
 
Id. at 162.  In response to the government's objection, 
Attorney Colon confirmed her possession of the letters, 
responding: "[T]his is not my case-in-chief, and I have not 
decided whether or not I'm going to use these letters in my 
case-in-chief.  It depends on what this witness testifies to on 
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cross-examination.  There may not be any need to use those 
letters in my case-in-chief."  Id. at 163 (emphasis added).   
 Based upon the record before us, it appears that Mark's 
counsel, but not the government, possessed the Isaac letters.  
This severely undercuts Mark's contention that the 
government suppressed or withheld evidence in violation of 
Brady.  In addition, because the record makes clear that Mark 
was in possession of some of the Isaac Letters, but he fails to 
produce any record evidence of them before this Court, we 
can neither determine whether any additional letters exist, nor 
can we analyze their content.  Without such evidence, Mark 
cannot demonstrate, beyond the point of mere speculation, 
that additional letters exist beyond those he already had in his 
possession in 2007.  The mere possibility that additional 
letters may exist, without more, is insufficient to establish the 
existence of a Brady violation.  United States v. Ramos, 27 
F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 1994) ("We think it unwise to infer the 
existence of Brady material based upon speculation alone.").  
Because Mark had the Isaac Letters in his possession at his 
2007 trial, and he has not demonstrated, beyond mere 
speculation, that any additional letters exist, we cannot 
conclude that that the government has suppressed or withheld 
any evidence relating to the Isaac Letters from the defense.  
We will reject Mark's claim that a Brady violation has 
occurred.           
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's judgments of conviction and sentence as to Freeman.  
We will affirm the District Court's judgment of conviction as 
to Mark, but will vacate the judgment of sentence and remand 
for resentencing for further development of the record.  
